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Aesthetics and the Environment: Repatriating Humanity
  Nikolaos Gkogkas 
Abstract
If aesthetics is to claim its place among the fundamental
philosophical disciplines, it must adequately deal with the
ecological challenge, that is, the need to explain the
continuity-relation between human and non-human
environments. To that effect, Arnold Berleant's aesthetics of
engagement constitutes an attractive proposal. Its critics
(Allen Carlson and others) seem to miss its point and attack it
on the basis of a particular understanding of Kantian aesthetics
(mainly the disinterestedness thesis). But not only can
Berleant's aesthetics meet the ecological challenge; it is also
possible that it encourages a re-evaluation of traditional
aesthetic categories (like disinterestedness) without
necessarily precipitating a need to jettison their deeply
entrenched significance.
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1. Caring about the Environment
There is a sense in which our epistemic relation to the
environment, as the sum of whatever surrounds us, would
appear to dictate the way in which we may wish to treat,
perceive, or conceive our environment. For instance, our
present-day ecological concerns are a decisive feature of the
different ways we have come to relate to the environment.
These ecological concerns are, of course, partly the result of
mounting scientific evidence to the effect that whatever goes
around comes around, that is, in altering our environment to
suit our various needs and wishes we are inadvertently altering
the conditions that give rise to these needs and wishes. In
other words, science as the paradigmatic set of available
epistemic tools makes us realize that, in altering our
environment, we are altering ourselves, since our needs and
wishes cannot be satisfied outside the environment as the
continuum we are an integral part of. Consequently, it makes
sense perhaps to say that getting to know our environment,
getting to know the way natural processes develop and
interact, makes us change our attitude towards it. It makes us
appreciate the unbreakable link that transposes our well-being
into the wider embrace of the environment's well-being and
well-functioning. Aesthetic appreciation of natural and human-
made environments is, of course, one aspect of this
unbreakable link to whatever we need or wish to gain from our
surroundings. This is the aspect I wish to concentrate on in
this paper.
The crucial distinction here is precisely the distinction between
the human element and the non-human element; the
distinction between the contained and the container. In order
to understand properly the nature of aesthetic experience, this
distinction needs to be qualified. Is it then, as above, an
epistemically derived distinction? Without going into great
detail concerning science and its methodologies, what is
undoubtedly involved in the ecological-scientific understanding
of the environment is a claim to (some high degree of)
objectivity. This claim amounts to the familiar requirement
that epistemic detachment be necessary for proper scientific
examination. The workings of the environment are better
revealed to its human scientific observer when the epistemic
distance between the two is maintained. This is perhaps as it
should be. However, scientific detachment concerning the
environment cannot function in itself as the basis for caring
about the environment (and about its human inhabitants). The
most brilliant of environmental scientists does not have to see
anything, as an environmental scientist, in, for instance, the
possible extinction of the human species from the face of the
Earth, other than perhaps one more phase in the constant
change of natural landscapes, ruled by relevant processes,
causes, and effects, etc.
In other words, the appreciation of our surroundings on an
epistemic basis does not warrant any sort of consideration to
the effect that our surroundings are also worth conserving,
that it is a good thing to protect and promote life, that nature
is beautiful, and so on. The ecological-scientific approach is by
no means incompatible with such considerations but it cannot
provide any grounds for them, either. Therefore, an aesthetics
that describes the relation between human and non-human
environments in terms of epistemic distance and discontinuity
is at best incomplete. The alternative is, of course, a view
according to which the environment is not merely some sort of
objective externality waiting to be categorized and
departmentalized on the basis of human needs and wishes.
Being fully aware of the interdependency relations linking
human and non-human environments, this alternative
aesthetics speaks of engagement and of return to the
environment as the seamless extension of our limbs, our
senses, and our ideas.
2. Repatriation and the Environment
The notion of repatriation, which serves here as a metaphor
for the general argument I am defending, is bound up with a
few basic implications. First, there must be such a thing as a
"homeland." In the present context, this homeland is obviously
the environment as the sum of whatever surrounds us. It
includes not only natural surroundings but also human-made
structures and, in a sense, our body itself (to the degree that
we perceive it as something at least partly external).[1]
Repatriation also obviously implies a condition of separation or
departure form the homeland. For repatriation as "return to"
the homeland means that we are no longer inhabitants of the
environment, which we may perceive as our homeland. It
follows that a relation of externality or distance seems to apply
between what is perceived as surrounding (that is, the
environment) and what is being surrounded (that is, the
human observer). Crucially, however, it is finally implied that a
return to the homeland is in itself something worth pursuing.
Repatriation is about cancelling somehow the distance
separating us from the externality of whatever surrounds us
because we wish to become again part of the real or imagined
homeland.
As argued above, epistemic or cognitive appropriation does
not suffice as an explanation for our need to care about our
environment and possibly to derive pleasure from it, aesthetic
or otherwise. In fact, cognitive appropriation is perfectly
consistent with maintaining and even increasing a lack of care.
For the relation of externality separating us from our
environment becomes the very foundation of our getting to
know the environment objectively and scientifically. The
scientific model does not primarily concern itself with how to
relate to the object of knowledge (that is the environment). It
studies this object already within its externality. The route of
repatriation is completely hidden from view, which means that
the possibility of returning to the homeland and of taking care
of it can never be actualized.
Furthermore, the route of repatriation is not opened up by the
impetus to familiarize oneself, in the ordinary sense, with as
many different kinds of environments as possible. Narrowing
the distance of indifference, which separates us from what
surrounds us, is not simply about "having been there," "seen
this," "done that." If one has not set out armed with a caring
attitude, eager to recognize and to embrace unfamiliar
environments, then whatever one meets and perceives on
one's way may always remain beyond the threshold of care
and genuine appreciation. Plotinus, in his own context, put it
thus:
"Let us flee then to the beloved Fatherland": this
is the soundest counsel. But what is this flight?
How are we to gain the open sea? [. . .] The
Fatherland to us is There whence we have come,
and There is The Father. What then is our course,
what the manner of our flight? This is not a
journey for the feet; the feet bring us only from
land to land; nor need you think of coach or ship
to carry you away; all this order of things you
must set aside and refuse to see: you must close
the eyes and call instead upon another vision
which is to be waked within you, a vision, the
birth-right of all, which few turn to use.[2]
This is indeed an altogether different kind of vision. A kind of
vision that, although perceiving the surroundings as somewhat
external or unfamiliar to the eye, also perceives their
difference as an invitation back to the homeland, as a sure
sign of the fact that what sees and what is seen must care
about each other as they care about their own selves[3].
Namely, it is no longer the case that we are only surrounded
by the environment but that we are also part of that very
environment. The route of repatriation does not lead away
from us but defines the context of our intricate relation with
what seemed to be around us at a distance. We are part of the
environment and the environment is partly us. The homeland
is not somewhere "out there" because we are already part of
it.
Far from belonging to an otherworldly state of affairs, this
Plotinian imagery has already become entrenched (even if
unconsciously so) in our dealings with nature and the
environment, and in our newly found sense of being one with
nature, of being shaped, in turn, by the shapes we impose on
our surroundings, and of being dependant for our well-being in
general on the well-being of the different specific environments
we are part of. Neither science nor the tourist consciousness
alone have proved adequate guides for the discovery that we
inadvertently belong to the places and spaces we seem to
inhabit. For science and the tourist consciousness, there is and
there will always be "some other place" to explore not
currently related to our present homeland, and definitely not
presupposing any caring attitude on our part. It is true that, as
I pointed out before, this newly found homeland implies a prior
condition of having been separate from it. But no matter; it is
better late than never.
My further claim then is this: If we are to work for a
meaningful philosophical understanding of the aesthetic aspect
of nature and the environment, this understanding has to
accommodate our deep and justified ecological concerns. Such
concerns are perhaps more readily defensible on moral,
political, economical, and other similar grounds. But they
should also be defensible on aesthetic grounds, employing
ideas like repatriation as the opposite of distance, externality,
and lack of care. This prospect is not only promising for the
environment; it can also attest to the centrality of aesthetics
as an active and profoundly relevant philosophical discipline.
3. Aesthetics of Repatriation
In this perspective, Berleant's aesthetics of the environment
can be accurately described as an aesthetics of repatriation.[4]
It is an aesthetics that seeks to reconcile the perceivable world
and its human inhabitant, and to cancel the distance of
indifference that may be separating them, because meeting
our aesthetic needs and wishes is tantamount to caring about
our environment in an aesthetic sense (and vice versa). This
aesthetics concentrates on the multiple levels of experiencing
the environment while being an integral part of it. Berleant
calls this an "aesthetics of engagement." What is engaged is
our capacity to feel and sense our surroundings in a way that
does not pose false barriers between the alleged subject and
object of feeling and sensing. What is activated is all of our
senses without exception (smell, touch, taste, sight, hearing,
kinaesthesis, sense of balance, and so on).[5] Our whole body
becomes a place of meeting between the inside and the
outside; it is no longer the case that we are concerned with
how the inside and the outside may be, or may have been,
different.
The points that follow highlight briefly the particular ways in
which Berleant's aesthetics is an aesthetics of repatriation in
the above sense. (These points will subsequently be addressed
from the converse perspective, the one that could be described
as the aesthetics of separation.)
A. Perception and Sensibility
The aesthetics of engagement is naturally an aesthetics of
perceptual engagement. However, perceptions are never only
bare facts. What is perceived through the senses is at the
same time understood as being perceived through the senses.
It is never a purely external event that happens to affect the
mechanics of our bodies. It can never be stripped of all
semantic significance, of all association with prior knowledge,
memory, connotation, evocative content, intentional design,
and so on. "Being sensible" means "being perceivable," but
also "making good sense." Berleant is explicit in using the
term 'sensibility' "in its double significance, referring both to
the senses and to meanings, for perception and import join in
the integrity of our experience."[6] The process of repatriation
can be now activated. What is perceived does not of course
coincide with the perceiver; but it can only make sense for the
perceiver to the degree that it becomes part of his or her web
of related experiences. We do not receive signals from the
environment that surrounds us without being conscious of the
fact that we are contained in it, that we are partly it, and that
we should care about it as we care about ourselves.
B. Art and Nature
An aesthetics of experiential engagement with the
environment obviously relates to both natural and artificial
environments; to landscapes and cityscapes; to cave-dwellings
and building-dwellings; to flowers and machines; and so on.
"The entire sensible world is included within the purview of
aesthetics," Berleant says.[7] Art, the traditionally favored
subject matter of philosophical aesthetics, must also be
included here. For art cannot but be part of our environment,
just like everything else. There is no obvious reason for raising
a barrier between experiencing artworks and experiencing our
everyday surroundings in an engaged way. Berleant stresses
precisely the relation of "continuity between art and life."[8]
Art deals with ways of experiencing the world no less than
living itself does. We rediscover the world as our homeland,
and art is part of this homeland.
C. Disinterestedness, the Contemplating Subject, and the
Contemplated Object
Perception and nature thus broadly conceived are perfectly
consistent with the pervasive ecological concerns of our times,
and are in accordance with the repatriation model employed
here. Berleant's further central objective is to safeguard the
dynamic of this account by attacking disinterestedness as the
dominant aesthetic category of traditional Western aesthetics.
Disinterestedness is linked to the rise of the Fine Arts, to the
idea of "art for art's sake," and to certain versions of
formalism. It is traceable back through Kant to some of the
early modern British empiricists.[9] According to Budd's
formulation (following Kant), "a positive affective response to
an item is disinterested only if it is not, or not just, pleasure in
the satisfaction of a desire that the world should be a certain
way."[10] We are not supposed to take pleasure in
aesthetically experiencing the world just because we may
derive any truths from this experience or just because we may
realize what kinds of things could turn this world into a better
place for us. The focus of our pleasure is supposed to be the
experience itself. For the aesthetics of engagement, this very
fact may not necessarily be a problem, as I am going to point
out towards the end of this paper. Just as is the case with the
scientific, detached consciousness, aesthetic disinterestedness
does not necessarily dictate a lack of aesthetic care about the
environment; but it is surely compatible with such a lack. In
fact, all it does is to deny that the aesthetic attitude implies a
particular kind of foundation; it does not, however, seem to
propose an alternative foundation. It seems to be suggesting
that, once we strip away every "desire that the world should
be a certain way," there is still something left, and this thing is
the aesthetic experience. But there is no reason given for this
leftover as a quasi default function of the human mind.
Therefore, there is indeed a fundamental sense in which the
care and repatriation principle can be illuminating here as a
truly alternative description of aesthetic experience. For, in
talking about an "affective response to an item," we have
unwittingly separated the response from the item, the
surroundings from the surrounded;and we have artificially
created the default vacuum. Disinterested contemplation of the
surroundings is misleading for it implies a state of mind and
an observing subject distinct from, and apparently immune to,
the state of affairs or objects that help shape the observing
subject itself. In accordance with Berleant's point of view,
traditional aesthetics of such a persuasion arbitrarily and
falsely fractures the actual continuity of the content of
aesthetic experience without adequately compensating for this
and, therefore, without actually giving any credence to the
duty of aesthetic care towards the environment.
D. An Experience That Is Aesthetic Throughout
In many ways, Berleant's project for an experientially engaged
aesthetics echoes some of Dewey's early concerns in the first
half of the twentieth century. Dewey describes the basic
condition for all experience -and, thus, the basic condition for
any aesthetic experience-in terms of a
-felt relationship between doing and undergoing
as the organism and environment interact.
Position expresses the poised readiness of the live
creature to meet the impact of surrounding
forces, to meet so as to endure and to persist, to
extend or expand through undergoing the very
forces that, apart from its response, are
indifferent and hostile.[11]
Berleant's engaged aesthetic response similarly consists in the
dynamic and fluctuating rhythm that keeps the perceiver and
what is perceived in a sort of harmonious and intertwined
relationship of constant give and take (or take and give).
Denying the reality of this relationship means denying the
reality of the related parts-the organism and the environment.
Since, then, this relationship is at its core an engaged one, and
since experiential engagement is for Berleant the mark of the
aesthetic, the implication is that all experience as such, that is,
all experience as engaged experience, is also aesthetically
charged. "The aesthetic becomes, then, a universal category,
not the universal category but the omnipresent concept of a
pervasive feature of experience."[12] Universally aesthetic
experience is not, of course, the contemplative reception of
objects; it is the making sense of reception, of objects, and of
subjects alike. We do not suddenly discover that the whole
world is beautiful; it is our engaged interrelation with the
world, our caring about it, which nurtures beauty. Beauty or
any other aesthetic category resides in the bridges we build
while engaging experientially with the world; it is neither
"here" on our side (accessed internally) nor "there" on the
other side (passively awaiting to be discovered). There is also
an important further offshoot in this sort of engaged aesthetics
which is that as much as it is about engagement with the
surrounding environments, it is also about engagement with
other human beings that are part of these environments. In
other words, it is a humanizing aesthetics, as well as an
ecological aesthetics.
4. Aesthetics of Separation
A. Perception and Sensibility
From a general perspective that appears to be opposing all
this, the aesthetic nature of perception is often qualified in
terms of different kinds of ontological distinctions or different
degrees of separation between those experiences that may be
deemed as aesthetic and those that are allegedly not so.
Various philosophies of art find it legitimate to disregard the
aesthetics of experiencing the environment, as opposed to the
aesthetics of experiencing those segments of the environment
that may qualify as art. This is, after all, one of the reasons
why environmental aesthetics has had a relatively short
history.
Hegel believed that beauty in art stands ontologically higher
than any beauty in nature because of the privileged relation
holding between art and what he calls the Ideal.[13] The
perception of beauty in art involves a coming into contact with
a loftier universal consciousness, whereas nature lies at a
lower level that is almost impenetrable by this consciousness.
Nature is, of course, perceivable, but in a way that does not
make it possible for our aesthetic sensibilities to be activated
(at least not beyond a crucial point). This is then an aesthetics
of separation and disengagement from certain aspects of
experience.
B. Art and Nature
More recently, in his discussion about found objects as
artworks, or about the distinction between art and non-art,
Lamarque notes that
Warhol's work [Brillo Boxes], as well as being
made up of physical objects, is also an intentional
object in this technical sense: it embodies a
thought, it has a content, it expresses a meaning
and it is embedded in art history, whereas the
other objects [commercial Brillo boxes] have no
meaning and do not stand for anything, even
though they too are human artefacts, have a
function and conform to a design.[14]
Again, perceiving one's environment (instantiated here by the
commercial Brillo boxes) is seen as devoid of thought, content,
meaning, history. In other words, nature in this form remains
inert and not subject to experiential engagement. The fact of
its artificiality, its function and design, the link to particular
modes of our experience of the world (as commodification
"automata," for example) is meant to be meaningless-
something that is indeed a contradiction in terms.
Of course, the commercial Brillo boxes are part of a created,
artificial environment; they are part of a "nature" created by
humans. In this respect, not only does the aesthetics of
separation raise questionable barriers between art and non-art
but also between created and non-created environments. For,
presumably, if the commercial Brillo box lies outside of what is
taken as the privileged locus of aesthetic experience (i.e.
Warhol's Brillo Boxes) on count of an artificiality that is not
artistic, then it seems that, say, the view through my window
and out on the river must be "twice-removed" on the same
count, according to the aesthetics of separation.[15] However,
for the aesthetics of care and repatriation, natural
environments that are not conceived as human creations are
still inseparable from certain meanings, functions, histories,
values that help define them. Enjoying the view from my
window involves a deep awareness of such meanings and
functions, etc.; an awareness of my own particular state of
mind, of the river's changeable surface, of the sounds and
smells coming from within my room and from without, of past,
present, and anticipated relevant observations, memories,
thoughts, intentions, and so on. If such factors define the
aesthetic experience of what Lamarque accepts as art (i.e.
Warhol's Brillo Boxes), they should also suffice for experiencing
aesthetically what he rejects as non-art (i.e. commercial Brillo
boxes). Furthermore, they should also suffice for experiencing
aesthetically what seems to lie still further away in the long
chain of interaction between human and non-human nature,
such as the river I see out of my window.
Undoubtedly, such accounts of the aesthetic cannot be taken
as refutations of Berleant's aesthetics of engagement, since
they seem at least to leave the possibility of aesthetic
engagement with nature open in principle. However, they are
clearly incongruent with the wider ecological (and thus also
humanistic) concerns addressed by the aesthetics of
repatriation and of care about the environment, and this is all
I wish to defend here.
C. Disinterestedness, the Contemplating Subject, and the
Contemplated Object
Against Berleant, to suppose that there are degrees of
aesthetic separation, as above, amounts, in effect, to revert to
the comforting situation of externality and objectification. It
seems comforting because it allows us to avoid the trouble of
engaging and cancelling the barriers that prevent aesthetic
care and repatriation. (Remember Plotinus, above: "Call
instead upon another vision which is to be waked within you, a
vision, the birth-right of all, which few turn to use.") But,
remarkably, it is precisely this aesthetic duty, so to speak,
that Carlson finds difficult to accept. Berleant's aesthetic
experience is, for Carlson, much like a "subjective flight of
fancy."[16] There seem to be no "objective" grounds on which
to test the validity of this experience. The relation between the
experiencing subject and the experienced object becomes one
of many other "subjective" relations such as love, relations
that "notoriously lack objectivity. It is a well-known fact that
every child appears beautiful to his or her parents."[17]
Naturally, on the one hand, to say that what is taken to be
subjective lacks objectivity does not explain either subjectivity
or objectivity. On the other hand, to say that the love for one's
children is somehow aesthetically biased shows that either one
has never loved or that one refuses to see what love is about.
The love for one's children is of course all about being biased.
When I say I find my child beautiful, I do not maintain that "I
am making a subjective aesthetic claim, that may turn out to
be false on some external objective grounds." Even if there
were indeed any external objective grounds on which to test
such a judgment, this judgment would no longer be about the
relation between my child and myself; it would be about
something entirely different. (The robustness perhaps of my
child's bone structure? The symmetry of his or her facial
features?)
Similarly, Budd swiftly dismisses the whole of Berleant's
project on the basis that it does away with disinterested,
"objective" attention and the contemplative attitude without
providing anything to replace them with.[18] But how to
replace something that was not even there in the first place?
Were it not for the distorting lens of the aesthetics of
separation, the perceived or contemplated, together with the
one that perceives or contemplates, would have always
remained intertwined.
Of course, it is always legitimate to turn to the aesthetics of
repatriation itself and question the ways in which perceiver
and perceived are thus distinct while remaining deeply
engaged and involved with one another. However, neither
Carlson nor Budd seem to be addressing this point. Therefore,
I need not be concerned with it regarding my main argument
here.[19]
D. An Experience That Is Aesthetic Throughout
Finally, the ubiquitous universality of Berleant's engaged
aesthetics may be questioned as unable to distinguish between
"superficial" aesthetic experiences and "serious" aesthetic
experiences. If everything and anything can be experienced
aesthetically from the engagement point of view, there may be
a problem in evaluating different experiences. Again, for
Carlson this problem forces us to focus on the "true character"
of nature, which is by and large the subject matter of our
natural sciences. His natural environmental model is precisely
intended as a model for the appreciation of the environment,
an appreciation that becomes aesthetic as far as it is enriched
by our knowledge about the inner workings of nature.[20]
Carlson writes:
Information about the object's nature, about its
genesis, type, and properties, is necessary for
appropriate aesthetic appreciation. For example,
in appreciating a natural environment such as an
alpine meadow, it is important to know, for
instance, that it survives under constraints
imposed by the climate of high altitude. With such
knowledge comes the understanding that
diminutive size in flora is an adaptation to such
constraints. [. . .][21]
That one needs to be aware of alpine biology in order to
appreciate aesthetically the alpine meadow sounds bizarre, to
say the least. As I argued at the beginning, no amount of
scientific knowledge about natural environmental processes
can inescapably, in and of itself, trigger aesthetic appreciation.
Compare the account given by the haiku poet Noburo
Fujiwara:
Every place is full of poetry. All one has to do is
go find the poems. That's why we can write one
hundred poems in a day about a place we visit.
We select an interesting and beautiful place and,
on the spot, compose its poetry.[22]
The poet is simply immersed into the environment without
having to turn to the physicist's laboratory. And not only does
he experience nature aesthetically but he is also able to
transform this into art, which seems to be enriching and
extending the original experience. It is true that in this
particular instance the poet seems to be inspired by
"interesting and beautiful" places. But this does not have to be
the norm. A devastated, polluted, or conventionally ugly and
uninteresting environment can be equally well-experienced
aesthetically and spur aesthetic creativity as the expression of
corresponding sentiments, for example. What is decisive is the
attitude of aesthetic care and the repatriating relation of
engagement with that environment; not the environment's
features when these are viewed under the dissecting eye of a
scientifically oriented consciousness.
Damien Hirst once described the World Trade Center disaster
notoriously as a work of unparalleled art in terms of its visual
impact and power. He later tried to disassociate explicitly this
impact from the disaster's wickedness. Namely, he tried to
identify and single out one aspect of our experiencing this
event, an aspect that relies on our ability to connect to the
event as a seismic shake-up of our inner feelings. It is not by
simply contemplating the event but by trying to imagine
ourselves within it that we might begin to sense this impact
and its power to reshape our understanding of our own relation
to the possibility of evil, our relation to the tragedies of human
life and, furthermore, to the tragedies of human political
history. The fact that it did not presumably entail any sort of
artistic intentions, and the fact that it inadvertently affected a
cityscape rather than a natural landscape, do not alter
fundamentally our relation to this event as a relation to the
externality of what surrounds us.
Needless to say, one may not become profoundly affected by
the most enticing of natural or created environments but one
is surely capable of engaging in some sort of aesthetic
conversation with such an environment. That all engaged
experience is aesthetic does not exclude the possibility of
having degrees of engagement and of immersion in the
experience. In other words, it is not the case that the
aesthetics of repatriation makes us feel at a loss when we
need to compare relevant experiences. To return to my
experience of the view outside my window, I could spend a
whole life simply by looking at the river outside for the
purpose of relaxing my eyes away from my computer screen.
Almost any sort of view would do for this purpose. However,
this experience of mine can become more and more engaged
and, thus, more and more aesthetic, to the extent that I
actually manage to imagine myself as coming into a more
direct kind of experiential contact with the river outside or
further toward the horizon. I could begin to see the river's
surface as an invitation to explore the contours of the flowing
water, to uncover what may lie underneath the surface, or
even to willingly alter all this (in the spirit perhaps of some of
Robert Smithson's work[23]). Or, further, I could imagine the
whole river as a meandering corridor of mirror or glass, where
it would be possible to walk on and imaginatively transfer my
senses and my thoughts about what now appears as my
distant surroundings (perhaps now in the spirit of Christo and
Jeanne-Claude[24]). In every case, I could see increasingly
my whole being as a formation that involves, somehow
crucially, the existence of the observed view outside and of the
ways in which I can interact with it. In doing this, I would
become increasingly engaged with what I see in a way that
can only be described as aesthetic, engendered through my
caring about the river as I care about my own particular
position in the world.
Carlson again seems to think that this is not enough, that
degrees of aesthetic appreciation are inadequate in accounting
for qualitatively differing aesthetic experiences.[25] But if this
is true (and I am not at all sure it is), Carlson's own natural
environmental model must find itself in exactly the same
position. For, presumably, the more I know about the natural
processes shaping a given environment, the more my
aesthetic appreciation of it becomes complete.
Perhaps more importantly, Carlson's reliance on information
supplied by the natural sciences constitutes a kind of choice
that is itself theoretically suspect. At best, it is a choice that
may be flowing from a certain attitude towards the
environment rather than dictating that attitude, for it appears
as the provider of an allegedly objective set of (scientific)
criteria, after having subjectively endorsed these criteria. In
other words, the aesthetics of separation falls here on its own
sword. As Heyd puts it:
The "stories of science" are also deeply cultural
since they arise from very particular cultural
conditions (as were given in Modern Europe) and
serve very specific cultural goals (namely
predictive and retrospective explanation). [. . .]
The illusion that science is not driven by values,
though, can only be upheld by those so deeply
involved in its world picture that they lack the
capacity for critical scrutiny of what science
is.[26]
I did point out at the beginning that science may provide its
own model for understanding the environment, but this model
is hardly concerned with continuities linking the surrounded
and its surroundings or with the duty of care towards our
environments and ourselves. It is now obvious that to use this
scientific model in order to infer the untenability of such
continuities begs the question and is a lot like eating one's
cake and having it, too.
5. An Aesthetics for the Environment
In sum, I have not tried here so much to defend a particular
version of what one may call the "aesthetics of repatriation"
regarding the environment. With Berleant's project of aesthetic
engagement in mind, I have tried to show that, apart from any
other merits that may count in its favor, such an aesthetics is
congruent with the ecological and humanitarian concerns of
our age. A fortiori, the opponents of this aesthetics seem to be
either oblivious its true content or unable to make sense of
the objections it poses for the various aesthetics of separation.
It has to be said, however, that Berleant is not content simply
with articulating a new paradigm for aesthetic appreciation.
One of his main concerns is to target actively, in turn, what he
sees as the Kantian plague of disinterestedness, distance, and
objectification in traditional philosophical aesthetics. But the
version of aesthetic Kantianism he is attacking is not
necessarily the only possible one. The aesthetics of
repatriation may be compatible with a particular understanding
of disinterestedness that is free from the sin of objectification
and, crucially, that can actively support the duty of aesthetic
care. Indeed McGhee (among others) has indicated that such
an understanding is not only possible but also closer perhaps
to Kant's proper intentions.[27] Disinterested pleasure in
beauty is not necessarily a pleasure that polarizes the
perceiver versus the perceived, even in the absence of any
relevant desires on the part of the former. The perceiver does
not derive pleasure from the perceived but from the
experience of perception itself and from the fruitful intuitions
the latter may evoke. In this respect, the activity of
experiencing aesthetically is the pleasure; it presupposes
subjects and objects but transcends them, repatriates them
back to the common ground that enables them both to be
what they are and to support one another.
Carlson again writes:
I may be totally engaged in the sensory qualities
of my toothache, indeed they may consume my
whole being, and yet this may not, and typically
would not, constitute an aesthetic experience.
Again, it seems that only something like
disinterestedness can make my pain somewhat
aesthetically appreciable.[28]
Indeed, let us say that I may aesthetically derive from my
toothache intuitions about the fragility of my body, the
transient character of delight, and the grim reality of suffering
(my own suffering as well as that of others). If this aesthetic
attitude towards my toothache is disinterested, how is it so?
The disinterestedness of distance says, in effect, that I can
take away the pain and keep the experience that was linked to
the pain. Therefore, the disinterestedness of distance betrays
an aesthetics of separation and hijacks one part of my
experience in the name of the whole. On the contrary, what
one could now call the disinterestedness of engagement would
keep the pain and keep the intuitions it evoked in me. These
intuitions are my regurgitated pain, and I cannot but care
about my pain if I care about the accompanying intuitions;
without the pain, the intuitions would have been different.
Given the appropriate circumstances in various aesthetic
contexts, I may have equally well experienced the fragility of
my body, the transient character of delight, and the grim
reality of suffering. But this alternative experience of mine
would not have been an experience as having been bound up
at some moment or other with my toothache. Only the latter
experience, and thus only the disinterestedness of
engagement, leads back again to that route of repatriation,
the route of harmonious living within the homeland of my
experienced world -from my teeth to the furthest reaches of all
environments.[29]
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